Topic: In-Depth

Siddharth Ramana: The Saudi Link to the Mumbai Attacks 868 Reads

Thursday, December 11, 2008 - 06:38 PM

11/12/2008
By Siddharth Ramana

A number of blogs and news articles reported the suspected role of Saudi financing in the recent Mumbai attacks. However, investigators have not publicly commented on any Saudi linkages. These reports are not unfounded if the historical patronage of terror fronts by the Saudi’s is investigated.

Saudi involvement with terrorism can be traced to its interpretation of Islam called Wahabism. Wahabism is a strong component of Saudi society and gains strength on the basis that it is the legitimizing factor for the Saudi Monarchy. Wahabism helped the Saud family consolidate its hold on the country and helped establish the modern state with the family as the imperial rulers. It is this combination of religious extremism and political control which resulted in the Saudi family engaging in intense efforts to preach Wahabism worldwide.

Sheikh Bin Baz, for example, the former grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia is regarded, in counter-terrorism circles, to be a leading extremist preacher of Wahabi influences worldwide. One account states, Bin Baz preached that the Koran “with absolute clarity states that there is a religious requirement to despise the infidel Jews and Christians and the other mushrikun [polytheists] until they believe in Allah alone”. Bin Baz is known to be the mentor of Abullah Azzam, who in return was a mentor to Osama Bin Laden. It was Azzam’s fatwa which called upon all Muslims to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1979 which brought Bin Laden to the sub-continent. Bin Baz was supportive of the fatwa and exhorted for help to the Mujahideen fighters.

Siddharth Ramana: Mumbai attacks: Old terror in a new bottle 366 Reads

Sunday, November 30, 2008 - 01:33 PM

By Siddharth Ramana
Contributor, Worldanalysis.net

Many commentators have described the 3 night terror crises which had befallen on Mumbai, India to be India’s 9/11. It was alleged to be the most deadly attack on the Indian state, which has witnessed nearly 4,000 killed in terrorist violence in the last few years. More significantly, it severely undermines the credibility of the Indian security establishment, more so when Mumbai was specifically named as a target by a group which had previously taken credit for a number of attacks in the past.

In my last paper on the Indian terrorist threat in August 2008, aptly titled “India: Terrorist’s favorite hunting ground”, I had written that in the aftermath of the Ahmedabad attacks; the security scenario reflected long standing ills. The same ills were magnified in this terror attack which effectively utilized the loopholes available in the interior security mechanism. According to reports, the Indian government was aware of a high risk to the targeted hotels and curiously yet did not review the status of the threat before it was reduced. Furthermore, in a shocking revelation the terrorists who carried out the attack arrived by sea. Flashback to 1993, when Mumbai (then called Bombay) was terrorized by serial bomb blasts ostensibly carried out by Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian gang lord in revenge for anti-Muslim riots in the city. The explosives for the blasts were said to have been smuggled via a sea route. The terrorists in the latest attack seem to have taken the very same route without encountering much/ or any resistance. With repeated threat perceptions being based on inputs of sea based smuggling and targets such as off shore oil rigs high on the terrorist hit list, the thought that the Indian security did not strengthen its naval monitoring of its waters is shocking. It is even more appalling that this attack occurred when Indian warships are monitoring Piracy activity off the Yemen coast, while India is not monitoring its own backyard.

The attacks on the city’s elite hotels and a Jewish cultural center, and the shocking ease with which the terrorists went around the city to their targets reflect an in depth knowledge of the city’s streets and landmarks. It cannot be discounted that there is a local hand in the attack, which otherwise seems to carry signatures of a well trained outfit. An outfit which beyond reasonable doubt had training imparted on naval operations and hostage situations.

Why did they attack?
The attacks on the central train station of Mumbai were most likely a deflection to allow the top security brass to be tied up there while the hotel crises were being embarked upon. Indeed, media reports indicate that the senior police staff of Mumbai met their end at the encounters taking place at the terminus and its nearby buildings where the terrorists sought to take refuge. The apathy of the terrorists and their planning allowed them to swiftly shift to a nearby hospital which was likely to be used as a hostage point as well. Interrogations of one of the captured terrorists, who tried to flee, would shed further light on this.

The terrorists were clearly focused on an international audience. The timing of the attack, the nature of the attack and the targets were all intended to garner as much international press coverage as possible. The attacks which started at 9.20 PM local time were intended for prime time news coverage. The demands from hostages to show their identity documents and the particular singling out of Israeli, British and American hostages was a strong departure from previous terrorist attacks which mainly targeted Indians. The terror attacks achieved the group’s interest of extensive coverage in the international media. Much more than space and time was devoted to the Indian attack than the previous attacks which occurred in the county.

The terrorists did not make any demands which would have interested the western audiences in particular. In purported conversations with local news channels, the terrorists claimed they wished to see an end to the humiliation of Muslims in India. Even an email claiming responsibility from the “Deccan Mujahideen” reiterated this statement. The lack of negotiations and the systematic murder of the Jewish inhabitants in the first few hours of the siege indicate this to be a deflection tactic as well.

The target was to ensure that India’s image as a tourist destination is eroded and investor confidence, already hard hit by the global economic meltdown, is lowered in India. More shockingly, the attack reiterates a chilling reminder sent in an earlier acknowledgement by nom de guerre -Indian Mujahideen which warned Indians that they could strike anywhere at anytime.

It would be important to note that in the aftermath of the Delhi serial blasts, a number of arrests were undertaken all over the country. A number of suspected IM members were arrested and plots supposedly foiled. The relative quiet from Islamic terrorism in the country would have been attributed to the IM infrastructure having been broken. This inactivity would not have been liked by terrorist groups who wished to retaliate.

Who are these terrorists?
The scale and nature of these attacks have strong imprints of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda groups are known to be operating in Pakistani territory and local militant groups such as the Jaish E Mohammad and Lashkar E Tayeeba are known to be affiliates of Al-Qaeda. According to the arrested terrorist, the attack was carried out by the Lashkar E Tayeeba and Indian officials have added that the group had received help from Dawood Ibrahim. It was reported by the media earlier, that Dawood had joined hands with the Lashkar which has been growing in international clout. Lashkar activities have not been limited to the troubled Indian state of Kashmir. Lashkar is believed to have been behind the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, an attack which has close resemblance to the weaponry and tactics carried out in Mumbai. Lashkar is also known to have organized fundraising for terrorist activities in Chechnya and its fighters have been arrested in Iraq as well.

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Siddharth Ramana: Need for Indian response in Somalia’s waters 392 Reads

Tuesday, November 18, 2008 - 02:00 PM

By Siddharth Ramana
Contributor, Worldanalysis.net

After months of negotiations, hijacked Ship MV Stolt Valor, which carried 18 Indian nationals on board was released. The Japanese firm which owned the ship has reportedly paid a ransom of $2.5 million to the Somalia based pirates. It was another example of the piracy off the horn of Africa which was resolved through ransom payment.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has noted that piracy in the region has risen by a significant 10% as compared to the considerable wane witnessed in other parts of the world this year. The report also reflects the increasing brazenness of the Somali pirates operating with modern armory and impunity.

India has earlier too borne witness to the acts of pirates when earlier this year, for example, the MV Victoria which embarked from Mumbai, with Indians among others on board was hijacked by pirates. Although subsequently released under ambiguous terms, it is speculated that ransom money was paid.

The Indian government’s belated response in dealing with the crises reflects a callous attitude to a very important region. Despite interests in maintaining a stronger presence, the government had stalled a decision for hot pursuit of pirates, arguing for discussions among the Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Law and Shipping (Times of India, 20 September 2008).

Contrasting the Stolt story with that of the French luxury yacht Le Ponant, which was hijacked by Somalia based pirates, the French government ordered a military operation with special commandos to launch a daring rescue of the hostages. While the French example cannot be feasible in all scenarios, it certainly pitches the case to act as a deterrent to the criminals of the high seas.

It was only after intense pressure from the wife of captive Captain Prabhat Goyal, that the government relented into allowing an Indian warship into the region to protect “Indian interests”. However, the Indian navy has a deeper strategic objective to achieve through its cooperation with other navies in the region in curbing piracy in the region.

In the past too, the Indian navy has helped combat piracy and has successfully contributed in patrolling the once piracy infested Malacca straits in South East Asia. Yemen too has been open to cooperating with regional powers in combating the menace of piracy. Already, the Indian navy has helped foiled two attempts since its deployment in the region. Patrolling the region provides India an effective image boost in the neighboring Arab countries, while also allowing for joint cooperation with NATO navies in the region.

The opportunity to patrol the Gulf of Aden would also bolster the ‘blue water’ capabilities of the Indian navy. Technically, a blue water navy is taken as one able to operate over 200 miles (320 kilometers) from shore. This is a measure which can also be used to counter growing Chinese influence in the region.

Algeria: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: ALGERIA 316 Reads

Tuesday, September 30, 2008 - 01:00 AM

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT
ALGERIA
30 SEPTEMBER 2008

UK Border Agency
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE

www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1224671304_algeria-101008.pdf

Siddharth Ramana: Yemen: Al-Qaeda’s homecoming 479 Reads

Wednesday, September 24, 2008 - 12:58 PM

By Siddharth Ramana
Researcher, British American Security Information Council, London (U.K)

Introduction

The 17 September 2008 attack on the US embassy in the capital of Yemen-Sanaa is a reminder of how Al-Qaeda is gaining significant ground in a vital country. The Yemen attack, which has all the hallmarks of Al-Qaeda, was claimed by Islamic Jihad, an affiliate outfit of Al-Qaeda, which does not have links with its namesake in the Palestinian territories.

This attack constitutes the second major successful attack on American interests in Yemen, the earlier one being the attack on the USS Cole at Aden in October 2000. That attack killed 17 soldiers and was linked to Al-Qaeda. While Al-Qaeda had not taken responsibility for the attack, Bin Laden in a videotape released in 2001 had praised those who “destroyed a destroyer that fearsome people fear” (CFR, December 2005). According to a US counter-terrorism official, the attack was the largest against a US facility since 9/11 (Newsweek, September 2008).

The attack can be traced to the active resurgence of the Islamic group in the country since the escape of a number of suspects in 2006 and the Yemeni government’s inability to deal with an increasingly belligerent tribal region which is providing shelter to the group’s members. It also seeks to serve as a reminder that Yemen continues to remain a pivotal piece in the war on terror, which can easily destabilize neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia and disrupt vital sea links in the region.

Backgrounder

American pressure on the Yemeni government has grown manifold to curtail extremism in the nation and bring the perpetuators to book. After the September 11 attacks on the United States, Yemen became a vital ally in the war against terror, especially owing to Bin Laden’s historical roots to the country.

Bin Laden has a strong affinity to Yemen and has been reported to have described it as “one of the best Arab and Muslim countries in terms of its adherence to tradition and the faith … [its] topography is mountainous, and its people are tribal and armed, and allow one to breathe clean air unblemished by humiliation.”

In the post-Afghanistan period, Bin Laden and other Mujahideen fighters sent weapons and finances to Yemen to assist Saleh-led insurgents reunify the country in 1990 by overthrowing the then communist regime in Southern Yemen. It was in Aden, that the first attack on American soldiers on their way to Somalia was launched.

Al-Qaeda has found that some of its Yemeni members are of great assistance in inserting al-Qaeda operatives into the states of East Africa, the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific, because of the Yemeni diaspora that was established centuries ago in those regions by Yemeni sailors and commercial traders (Jamestown, February 2008). Yemen’s geopolitical bearings also provide Al-Qaeda with a staging ground to launch attacks in Saudi Arabia. Militants recruited and trained in Yemen constitute a major threat to the Kingdom's national security. Recruited and trained in Yemen, these militants then cross the border to conduct operations in the Kingdom. Saudi forces find it difficult to curb such “border to target” operations as they are extremely difficult to detect. Often, there is only a short time, about 12-24 hours, between terrorists crossing the border and the attack itself (GRC, February 2008).

For Al-Qaeda, the strengthening of relations between the Yemeni and Saudi groups is a positive development as the organization's leadership has supported the establishment of transnational or regional organizations. Ayman Al-Zawahiri blessed the foundation of “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” that developed into a flexible network operating in five North African states and, over the past months, has proved its capability to operate region-wide. Similar is the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the tribal border area serves as a backyard for cross-border operations in Afghanistan (GRC, February 2008). If the Yemeni and Saudi groups' alliance is successful, this could take a pattern similar to the Afghan-Pakistan experience. Already, Al-Qaeda’s Saudi branch has been told to move supporters to Yemen to avoid Saudi security forces (Yemen Times, August 2008).

Yemen as a country is highly important to Bin Laden for it also provides it the kind of hospitable environment which he presumably enjoys in the border tribal regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda in Yemen is particularly strong in the governorates of Marib and Hadramaut, which offer topographical and tribal cultures very similar to that of Afghanistan. The two provinces also are inhabited by a welter of deeply conservative Islamic tribes—Marib alone has four powerful tribes with over 70 clans. As in Afghanistan, the mores of these Yemeni tribes cause their members to “think they must do their duty to protect those who are in need for protection whatever they have done. This feeling becomes even stronger if those who need protection are religious people, because the tribesmen here are greatly affected by religious discourse”. (Jamestown, February 2008)
In an interview, head of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Abu Osama highlighted the further importance of Hadramaut, when he said “Hadhramout is one of the government's arteries in terms of oil and because it is a coastal and investment [oriented] governorate, so we want to cut that artery.” (Yemen times, August 2008)

Yemen’s Counter-Terrorism