Category: Siddharth Ramana

Siddharth Ramana: The Saudi Link to the Mumbai Attacks 867 Reads

Thursday, December 11, 2008 - 06:38 PM

11/12/2008
By Siddharth Ramana

A number of blogs and news articles reported the suspected role of Saudi financing in the recent Mumbai attacks. However, investigators have not publicly commented on any Saudi linkages. These reports are not unfounded if the historical patronage of terror fronts by the Saudi’s is investigated.

Saudi involvement with terrorism can be traced to its interpretation of Islam called Wahabism. Wahabism is a strong component of Saudi society and gains strength on the basis that it is the legitimizing factor for the Saudi Monarchy. Wahabism helped the Saud family consolidate its hold on the country and helped establish the modern state with the family as the imperial rulers. It is this combination of religious extremism and political control which resulted in the Saudi family engaging in intense efforts to preach Wahabism worldwide.

Sheikh Bin Baz, for example, the former grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia is regarded, in counter-terrorism circles, to be a leading extremist preacher of Wahabi influences worldwide. One account states, Bin Baz preached that the Koran “with absolute clarity states that there is a religious requirement to despise the infidel Jews and Christians and the other mushrikun [polytheists] until they believe in Allah alone”. Bin Baz is known to be the mentor of Abullah Azzam, who in return was a mentor to Osama Bin Laden. It was Azzam’s fatwa which called upon all Muslims to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1979 which brought Bin Laden to the sub-continent. Bin Baz was supportive of the fatwa and exhorted for help to the Mujahideen fighters.

Siddharth Ramana: China-Pakistan: An unholy nuclear alliance 302 Reads

Thursday, December 04, 2008 - 04:58 PM

By Siddharth Ramana
Contributor, Worldanalysis.net

Download complete article: http://worldanalysis.net/download/ChinaPakistan.pdf

A deal which would further erode non-proliferation ideals was placed on a backburner by China, during the recent visit of Pakistan President Asif Zardari to Beijing . Zardari, who wished to develop a nuclear trade agreement with China as a rival to the Indo-US nuclear agreement had to return with a fraction of what he desired. A similar deal for Pakistan, which is outrightly rejected by the United States, would further sully the proliferation history of the Chinese-Pakistan partnership. It is in the interest of the non-proliferation regime that Pakistan is denied a chance to argue the Indian deal is a precedent for itself and further pressure should be applied on China to improve its own proliferation record.

Pakistan argued that the deal provides India with previously denied nuclear fuel and therefore would result in a significant boost to the Indian nuclear strategic program, and would escalate tensions in the region leading to an arms race. Former Pakistan President Musharraf even made a passionate plea for the United States to show Pakistan parity with India in order to placate domestic elements, who were increasingly viewing Pakistan as a slave to American interests. It was particularly embarrassing for the Pakistani ruling class to see arch rival India being a benefactor, even though it was the first to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia . President Bush however rejected any similar treatment to Pakistan, bluntly pointing out the different histories of India and Pakistan on nuclear proliferation.

China also views the Indo-US deal with a great deal of skepticism and has viewed the growing Indo-US military and economic bonhomie with concern that it is an alliance to counterweight its regional power. Although, China and India have embarked upon detailed negotiations to resolve outstanding border disputes and economic relations have been improving, there continues to be a great mistrust of Chinese motivations within the strategic community in India. China too, has undertaken double speak on its relations with India, including a statement from its Ambassador questioning territorial disputes with India. Underlying mistrust of India’s power ambitions have forced China to adopt a strategic alliance with Pakistan, which has included proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to the country.

China-Pakistan relationship

For China, Pakistan is essentially a surrogate army. Owing to traditional military rivalry, India has for decades maintained a Pakistan centric strategic policy which keeps its military tied up and limits its options against China. According to Husain Haqqani, of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “For China, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India”. “For Pakistan, China is a high-value guarantor of security against India.” In this mutually beneficial friendship however, owing to Pakistan’s limited strategic capability against India, China is essentially a needed ally, while China does not necessarily rely on Pakistan.

China-Pakistan relations are diverse, and the Chinese have a strong investment presence in Pakistan. According to Jing Huang, senior fellow in Asia Studies at the Brookings Institution, “Pakistan would welcome investments from China more than anywhere else because Chinese are our brothers and time-tested friends”. The two countries have cooperated on a variety of large-scale infrastructure projects in Pakistan, including highways, gold and copper mines, major electricity complexes and power plants, and numerous nuclear power projects. Pakistan helps China on a range of issues, including “providing intelligence, fighting terrorism, and repairing relations with the Muslim world”.

However, this strategic relationship has adopted a sinister dimension of proliferation of sensitive nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan. Commercially, as China began its economic reform and opening up in the early 1980s, defense industries and arms exporting companies were under tremendous pressure to tap into the lucrative international arms market. Pakistan became a valued customer for Chinese arms. Finally, given US concern about and emphasis on missile proliferation issues, Beijing has also found it useful to exploit them as bargaining leverage in dealing with Washington on issues important to China: US arms sales to Taiwan, TMD deployment in East Asia, among others. American intelligence reports have alleged that China has transferred complete M-11 missiles, missile related technology, and manufacturing assistance to Pakistan.

The M-11 is a single stage, solid fueled missile with a reported range of 290 km and a payload of 800 kg. While technically the M-11 missile does not fall within the MTCR parameter, they have the inherent capability of being able to deliver a 500 kg payload over 300 km. The fact that China has resisted joining the MTCR as a formal member, coupled with its ambiguous interpretation and implementation of its bilateral commitments with the United States, raises questions as to the seriousness of Chinese commitment to arms control and nonproliferation.

Significantly, some news reports suggest Chinese security agencies knew about Pakistani transfers of nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. China also had longstanding ties with Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, and head of an international black market nuclear network. "The Pakistani nuclear program is largely the result of Sino-Pakistani relations" says Huang.

China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation began in the early 1980s. The United States government and many Western analysts believe that China assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives prior to its accession to the NPT in 1992. In 1983, US intelligence agencies reported that China had transferred a complete nuclear weapon design to Pakistan, along with enough weapons-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons. China also reportedly helped Pakistan operate its Kahuta uranium-enrichment plant. According to media reports the amount transferred was enough for making 10 nuclear weapons

China also provided assistance and transferred dual-use materials that could be applied in the development of nuclear weapons. Beijing insists that China's assistance involved the provisions of peaceful technical information rather than weapons-related technologies or materials. According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang, nuclear energy cooperation between China and Pakistan is “absolutely for peaceful purpose.”

China allegedly involved Pakistani scientists in a nuclear test at its Lop Nur test site in 1989. On December 31, 1991, China signed a contract to build the Chashma 300-MW nuclear power reactor for Pakistan, and has agreed to build an additional three more reactors Chasma II (which is already under construction) and Chasma III and Chasma IV (III and IV are to be contractually agreed upon).

Beijing has adopted a number of measures to improve its proliferation image including publicly adopting responsible nuclear export policies after joining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and furthered its commitment by acceding to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992. In addition, Beijing has formally enunciated three principles governing its nuclear exports: (1) acceptance of IAEA safeguards; (2) peaceful use only; and (3) no re-transfers to a third country without China's prior consent.

In 1993 China and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed an agreement to apply IAEA safeguards to a Chinese nuclear power station sold to Pakistan (INFCIRC/418). In 1994, China reportedly turned down a Pakistani request to “correct” Pakistan's nuclear weapons and to use the Chinese Lop Nur testing range.

In recent years, China has also promulgated domestic laws regulating nuclear and dual-use exports. It has also played a highly constructive role in the six party talks in restricting the North Korean nuclear weapons program and also international efforts in curbing the Iranian nuclear program. Beijing, while advocating a nuclear deal for Pakistan, has indicated that a more detailed study of the Pakistani request would be needed by the Chinese leadership.

However, significant concerns continue to emanate out of Chinese exports, particularly to Pakistan. In 1995, a major controversy erupted over suspected sales of 5,000 specially designed ring magnets from the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) to a non-safeguarded Pakistani nuclear laboratory, which was allegedly involved in nuclear weapons work. China initially denied that the sale had taken place; a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman called the reports “groundless” and warned the United States not to impose sanctions based on “rumors.” Pakistan also denied that any transfer of sensitive nuclear technology had taken place. However, in talks with US officials, China eventually privately admitted that the sale had taken place, but argued that China should not be penalized for two reasons. First, China insisted that CNEIC had arranged the sale without the knowledge or consent of the central government. Second, China argued that the ring magnets were not magnetized, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Trigger List only covers ring magnets magnetized at a specific tolerance.

Suspicions of sensitive technological transfers resurfaced in August-September 1996, when reports indicated that China had agreed to sell a special industrial furnace and high-technology diagnostic equipment to a Pakistani nuclear facility, equipment which reportedly can be used in the construction of nuclear bombs. The reports were dismissed by the Chinese and investigators could not find sufficient evidence against China.

Siddharth Ramana: Mumbai attacks: Old terror in a new bottle 364 Reads

Sunday, November 30, 2008 - 01:33 PM

By Siddharth Ramana
Contributor, Worldanalysis.net

Many commentators have described the 3 night terror crises which had befallen on Mumbai, India to be India’s 9/11. It was alleged to be the most deadly attack on the Indian state, which has witnessed nearly 4,000 killed in terrorist violence in the last few years. More significantly, it severely undermines the credibility of the Indian security establishment, more so when Mumbai was specifically named as a target by a group which had previously taken credit for a number of attacks in the past.

In my last paper on the Indian terrorist threat in August 2008, aptly titled “India: Terrorist’s favorite hunting ground”, I had written that in the aftermath of the Ahmedabad attacks; the security scenario reflected long standing ills. The same ills were magnified in this terror attack which effectively utilized the loopholes available in the interior security mechanism. According to reports, the Indian government was aware of a high risk to the targeted hotels and curiously yet did not review the status of the threat before it was reduced. Furthermore, in a shocking revelation the terrorists who carried out the attack arrived by sea. Flashback to 1993, when Mumbai (then called Bombay) was terrorized by serial bomb blasts ostensibly carried out by Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian gang lord in revenge for anti-Muslim riots in the city. The explosives for the blasts were said to have been smuggled via a sea route. The terrorists in the latest attack seem to have taken the very same route without encountering much/ or any resistance. With repeated threat perceptions being based on inputs of sea based smuggling and targets such as off shore oil rigs high on the terrorist hit list, the thought that the Indian security did not strengthen its naval monitoring of its waters is shocking. It is even more appalling that this attack occurred when Indian warships are monitoring Piracy activity off the Yemen coast, while India is not monitoring its own backyard.

The attacks on the city’s elite hotels and a Jewish cultural center, and the shocking ease with which the terrorists went around the city to their targets reflect an in depth knowledge of the city’s streets and landmarks. It cannot be discounted that there is a local hand in the attack, which otherwise seems to carry signatures of a well trained outfit. An outfit which beyond reasonable doubt had training imparted on naval operations and hostage situations.

Why did they attack?
The attacks on the central train station of Mumbai were most likely a deflection to allow the top security brass to be tied up there while the hotel crises were being embarked upon. Indeed, media reports indicate that the senior police staff of Mumbai met their end at the encounters taking place at the terminus and its nearby buildings where the terrorists sought to take refuge. The apathy of the terrorists and their planning allowed them to swiftly shift to a nearby hospital which was likely to be used as a hostage point as well. Interrogations of one of the captured terrorists, who tried to flee, would shed further light on this.

The terrorists were clearly focused on an international audience. The timing of the attack, the nature of the attack and the targets were all intended to garner as much international press coverage as possible. The attacks which started at 9.20 PM local time were intended for prime time news coverage. The demands from hostages to show their identity documents and the particular singling out of Israeli, British and American hostages was a strong departure from previous terrorist attacks which mainly targeted Indians. The terror attacks achieved the group’s interest of extensive coverage in the international media. Much more than space and time was devoted to the Indian attack than the previous attacks which occurred in the county.

The terrorists did not make any demands which would have interested the western audiences in particular. In purported conversations with local news channels, the terrorists claimed they wished to see an end to the humiliation of Muslims in India. Even an email claiming responsibility from the “Deccan Mujahideen” reiterated this statement. The lack of negotiations and the systematic murder of the Jewish inhabitants in the first few hours of the siege indicate this to be a deflection tactic as well.

The target was to ensure that India’s image as a tourist destination is eroded and investor confidence, already hard hit by the global economic meltdown, is lowered in India. More shockingly, the attack reiterates a chilling reminder sent in an earlier acknowledgement by nom de guerre -Indian Mujahideen which warned Indians that they could strike anywhere at anytime.

It would be important to note that in the aftermath of the Delhi serial blasts, a number of arrests were undertaken all over the country. A number of suspected IM members were arrested and plots supposedly foiled. The relative quiet from Islamic terrorism in the country would have been attributed to the IM infrastructure having been broken. This inactivity would not have been liked by terrorist groups who wished to retaliate.

Who are these terrorists?
The scale and nature of these attacks have strong imprints of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda groups are known to be operating in Pakistani territory and local militant groups such as the Jaish E Mohammad and Lashkar E Tayeeba are known to be affiliates of Al-Qaeda. According to the arrested terrorist, the attack was carried out by the Lashkar E Tayeeba and Indian officials have added that the group had received help from Dawood Ibrahim. It was reported by the media earlier, that Dawood had joined hands with the Lashkar which has been growing in international clout. Lashkar activities have not been limited to the troubled Indian state of Kashmir. Lashkar is believed to have been behind the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, an attack which has close resemblance to the weaponry and tactics carried out in Mumbai. Lashkar is also known to have organized fundraising for terrorist activities in Chechnya and its fighters have been arrested in Iraq as well.

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Siddharth Ramana: Need for Indian response in Somalia’s waters 390 Reads

Tuesday, November 18, 2008 - 02:00 PM

By Siddharth Ramana
Contributor, Worldanalysis.net

After months of negotiations, hijacked Ship MV Stolt Valor, which carried 18 Indian nationals on board was released. The Japanese firm which owned the ship has reportedly paid a ransom of $2.5 million to the Somalia based pirates. It was another example of the piracy off the horn of Africa which was resolved through ransom payment.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has noted that piracy in the region has risen by a significant 10% as compared to the considerable wane witnessed in other parts of the world this year. The report also reflects the increasing brazenness of the Somali pirates operating with modern armory and impunity.

India has earlier too borne witness to the acts of pirates when earlier this year, for example, the MV Victoria which embarked from Mumbai, with Indians among others on board was hijacked by pirates. Although subsequently released under ambiguous terms, it is speculated that ransom money was paid.

The Indian government’s belated response in dealing with the crises reflects a callous attitude to a very important region. Despite interests in maintaining a stronger presence, the government had stalled a decision for hot pursuit of pirates, arguing for discussions among the Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Law and Shipping (Times of India, 20 September 2008).

Contrasting the Stolt story with that of the French luxury yacht Le Ponant, which was hijacked by Somalia based pirates, the French government ordered a military operation with special commandos to launch a daring rescue of the hostages. While the French example cannot be feasible in all scenarios, it certainly pitches the case to act as a deterrent to the criminals of the high seas.

It was only after intense pressure from the wife of captive Captain Prabhat Goyal, that the government relented into allowing an Indian warship into the region to protect “Indian interests”. However, the Indian navy has a deeper strategic objective to achieve through its cooperation with other navies in the region in curbing piracy in the region.

In the past too, the Indian navy has helped combat piracy and has successfully contributed in patrolling the once piracy infested Malacca straits in South East Asia. Yemen too has been open to cooperating with regional powers in combating the menace of piracy. Already, the Indian navy has helped foiled two attempts since its deployment in the region. Patrolling the region provides India an effective image boost in the neighboring Arab countries, while also allowing for joint cooperation with NATO navies in the region.

The opportunity to patrol the Gulf of Aden would also bolster the ‘blue water’ capabilities of the Indian navy. Technically, a blue water navy is taken as one able to operate over 200 miles (320 kilometers) from shore. This is a measure which can also be used to counter growing Chinese influence in the region.

Siddharth Ramana: Nuclear Iran: India has made its choice 440 Reads

Friday, October 17, 2008 - 05:12 AM

This article was originally released at British American Security Information Council, London (U.K) (BASIC)

By Siddharth Ramana
Researcher, British American Security Information Council, London (U.K)

This Paper is also available in pdf format

India and Iran share a long friendship, owing to common security interests in Afghanistan and trade relations. This friendship is perceived to be a strategic relationship, wherein the countries are in negotiations for a multi-billion dollar gas pipeline. However, in recent years, relations between the two countries has been eroding over delays in finalizing the pipeline agreement, the nuclear ambitions of Iran and the pro-Israeli/ American tilt of the Indian leadership.

The recently agreed US-India nuclear deal will provide India with previously restricted nuclear fuel and technology, giving India the benefits available to Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) members while still developing a nuclear weapon arsenal. Iran, a signatory to the NPT, is much aggrieved by what it sees as double standards. Similar assistance to that offered to India is offered to Iran under the unique condition of restrictions to its domestic fuel-cycle activities. Iran stands accused of violating its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and is suspected to have had a nuclear weapons program, for which they have been censured by both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board and UN Security Council. Revelations that Iran was a beneficiary, in the now infamous A.Q. Khan network have undermined any support they might have enjoyed from China and Russia. Verbal tirades against Israel by the President and the Supreme Leader have further isolated Iran, and magnified fears of the consequences arising from its nuclear ambitions. In this environment, at the IAEA Board in 2005 India chose to vote in favor of reporting Iran to the Security Council for violations of its safeguards obligations.

The vote's timing, during early negotiations on the Indo-US deal, and the preceding statements from American officials, relegated genuine Indian concerns of a nuclear Iran to the background. In September 2007, Richard Boucher, assistant secretary of state for South Asia, said "The Indian government is very well aware of the concerns over India's military relationship with Iran. What we are trying to do is for everybody to understand the facts of the matter." According to the US Ambassador to India, if India had not supported the censure of Iran, the nuclear deal would have been in trouble.

This had raised the hackles of Indian officials, who did not wish to be seen as being bulldozed into voting in favor of the western nations. Seeking to allay fears of American bullying, the Indian defense minister A.K Anthony articulated "India has very friendly relations with Iran. It will continue to do so. India's friendship will not come in the way of good relations with any other country."